In Part 14, I added the idea of societal leverage to our foundation of knowledge so that I can use it in this post to give a final assessment of the overall impact of fractional reserve banking on a society.
To do that analysis, I will get back to comparing the factual scenario (fractional reserve banking) to the counterfactual scenario (sticking with 100%-backed receipt money).
The factual scenario was to institute fractional reserve banking. This created a ton of bank leverage that also allowed for greater individual leverage (because now more cash was available for borrowing). Individual leverage is all well and good–people need to borrow money sometimes, especially for big expenditures like business ventures–but it’s really the bank leverage that initially caused so many problems because it artificially expanded the total cash in society, which meant that the WU:money exchange rate had a sudden and drastic change, thus initially making people experience the illusion of wealth before money prices adjusted to the new WU:money ratio. And then later those same people realized that they had made a bunch of foolhardy expenditures that they really couldn’t afford because of that illusion of wealth. There are many more detrimental effects on an economy when there’s a sudden shift in the value of money (and, therefore, the money prices of things are all out of whack), and they will be explained in later posts. But suffice it to say for now that this sudden shift caused an upheaval in the Avarian economy, which always results in the loss of a lot of wealth.
The counterfactual scenario was for the banker not to institute fractional reserve banking (maybe instead the Avarians had the foresight to institute an auditing system so that he couldn’t), but he still was able to furnish some loans to individuals by facilitating an effort to get depositors to pool and invest their excess cash wealth. Basically, the banker invented a primitive version of Kickstarter–it’s crowdfunding. And it involves no bank leverage and no exploitative loans. But it does of course still involve individual leverage because individual people are still borrowing money. The big downside of this scenario is that there won’t immediately be as much money made available for lending. But the value of money will remain much more stable, which will encourage investment, and the investments made by loaning someone else money will be through assentive loans, meaning the owners of the wealth that is being lent have agreed to temporarily give up that wealth in return for earning interest. The fact that they have agreed to loan their money probably means that they were able to make an informed decision about the risk of complete loss of their principal, so even if the investment does fail it will not be financially catastrophic in most cases.
Compare that to the impact of all people unconsentingly (it’s a new word) having a large percentage of their stored WUs stolen from them when the banker implements fractional reserve banking. Many of those people probably couldn’t stand to lose any of their WUs. And then the banker uses that stolen wealth to make exploitative loans so he can earn a ton of interest off it. This leads to a substantial shift in wealth from everyone to the banker. He will start to become wealthier and wealthier, and the people will think he has become so well off simply because the gold mining and banking businesses are very profitable these days, not knowing that he’s living off the wealth he has siphoned from them.
Hoping that fractional reserve banking will go away on its own at this point is naive. Why would the banker destroy the extra Goldnotes when they are paid back to him in the form of loan payments? Nope. What he’ll instead do is accumulate them until he has enough of them to fulfill another loan request. The WU:gold coin ratio will never go back to how it was without some external intervention forcing it.
You can probably see that, even in the short term (before we add in all the extra long-term issues that fractional reserve banking leads to), the institution of fractional reserve banking is a terrible idea. What’s crazy is that I learned about it in economics classes in college, and it was presented to me as a normal and interesting and benign fact of life. But when you dig in and really look at how it affects the total amount of and distribution of wealth of a society, it becomes a stark villain.
I’m not blind to the big upside fractional reserve banking has, at least in the short term–it makes more money available for borrowing, which ultimately can push society’s wealth forward much faster by funding new inventions and innovations. But that comes at the cost of forcefully taking away from every owner of Goldnotes a large percentage of their cash wealth to gain that benefit, and they don’t even get any of the interest earned on the loans that are made to those entrepreneurs using their wealth. This potential benefit to society also assumes that the person choosing who deserves the loans will do a good job finding the best place for the money to go.
So that’s the short-term analysis. Longer term, there are two huge and unambiguously negative impacts of instituting fractional reserve banking.
The first is that fractional reserve banking opens up the gate to Avaria’s monetary system continuing down money’s evolutionary road to more and more destructive situations. That will be illustrated thoroughly in the rest of this series, and you will see that the amount of wealth lost (and redistributed through exploitation) due to these monetary system changes is astounding.
The second negative long-term impact of fractional reserve banking is that it introduces bank leverage (plus some more individual leverage as well). Ultimately, bank leverage is probably the most risky form of leverage because, from a historical standpoint, it’s the kind that most commonly leads to societal defaults, which also will be illustrated in subsequent posts.
Based on all of that, here is how I will wrap up my assessment of fractional reserve banking: When you look at the short-term and long-term impacts it has, fractional reserve banking is the worst. No society should ever implement it.
Before I end this post, I want to address one more question that has arisen in my mind about all this. If a prudent amount of government leverage and individual leverage can be used beneficially, what about a prudent amount of bank leverage? Maybe just keep the reserve ratio nice and high so a bank failure is nearly impossible?
This could work, but don’t forget about the guaranteed costs of any amount of bank leverage: the change in the WU:money exchange rate, which causes people to lose a percentage of their WUs that were stored in cash and that causes prices to become unstable. Government leverage and individual leverage don’t have these same guaranteed downsides (assuming the loans they receive are assentive loans). So I would say that bank leverage is a form of leverage that you cannot “use prudently” like the other two types because, by definition, it relies on exploitative loans. Thus, the guaranteed, significant, generalized downsides of bank leverage make it not worth whatever benefits you hope to get out of it.
All right, that’s it for this post. In Part 16, I’ll first add a couple more short thoughts related to the institution of fractional reserve banking in Avaria, and then after that I’ll finally share what happens next.










